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INTRODUCTION 
During the past two decades, there has been a great increase in 
interest in moral development among psychological and educational 
researchers. One of the most exciting issues that has arisen in the 
area of moral development is that of whether people can distinguish 
moral issues from conventional issues. That is, can most individuals 
tell the difference between acts that are wrong because of their intrin-
sic features and acts that are wrong because of societal rules against 
them? 
In this study, 102 Catholic university students were administered 
a questionnaire listing 16 acts considered to be seriously wrong by the 
Catholic Church. The questionnaire tested whether the students consid-
ered each act to be a moral issue or a nonmoral issue by asking them to 
rate the acts on four different scales. Each of the four scales tested 
one of Turiel 's (1983) criteria for distinguishing between moral and 
nonmoral issues. The first scale tested the Seriousness criterion with 
a four-point scale from "very seriously wrong" to "not wrong at all"; 
moral issues should be considered to be more seriously wrong than nonmo-
ral issues. 
The second scale tested Intrinsicality; morally wrong acts should 
be seen as seriously wrong because they are considered to cause harm or 
injustice in themselves, while nonmoral acts should be considered not to 
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be wTong. Or nonmoral acts should be seen as fairly wrong, but not 
because they are seen to have intrinsically negative consequences. This 
was tested by having the subjects choose a justification for why each 
act was wrong from a list containing both intrinsic and extrinsic just-
ifications. The third scale measured Unalterability with a two-point 
scale (unalterable or alterable); moral issues should be unalterable and 
nonmoral issues should be alterable. The fourth scale tested Universal-
ity with a two-point scale (universal or not universal); moral rules 
should hold for all human beings and nonmoral rules should vary from 
culture to culture or from religion to religion. 
It was predicted that eight of the acts, designated as II II wrong , 
would be given more moral ratings on all four of the scales than the 
eight acts designated as 11nonwrong 11 • It was also hypothesized that, for 
the eight sexual acts (both the moral and the conventional ones), women 
would give more serious ratings, but would give fewer moral justific-
ations (the Intrinsicality scale). However no sex difference was pre-
dieted for the nonsexual acts. It was hoped that this study would show 
that the majority of Catholic undergraduates clearly see the distinction 
between morality and convention. 
CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Little research has been conducted in the area of discrimination 
between morality and convention because it is such a new field. Most of 
this research, however, suggests that individuals of many different ages 
agree that certain acts are morally wrong, certain acts are convention-
ally wrong and certain acts are not wrong at all. Moreover, most people 
have been shown to use the criteria described by Turiel (1983) to make 
these distinctions. 
Previous Research 
Turiel (1983) and Nucci and Junker (1982) have attempted to demon-
strate that, with respect to determining what is morally (universally 
and unalterably) right and what is morally wrong, there is virtual unan-
imity among judges. They have found that subjects in their studies 
agree on what acts are morally wrong, such as killing, hitting and hurt-
ing, and stealing. On the other hand, disagreements usually arise in 
matters of social conventions specific to religious and other cultural 
communities. For instance, attending Mass and avoiding birth control 
are rules specific to Catholics and are understood as being arbitrary 
(not applicable to all people at all times) and therefore conventional 
even by Catholics themselves. 
Elliott Turiel (1983) has outlined several criteria which he 
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believes are used by children and adults alike when they are distin-
guishing between the two domains. Here four of these criteria will be 
described: intrinsicality, unalterability, universality , and serious-
ness. Also, examples will be given of the studies that demonstrate 
that people use these four criteria. 
Intrinsicality 
The first criterion shown to be used by many subjects to distin-
guish between morality and convention has been arbitrarily designated 
"intrinsicality" in this study, although Turiel has not given it a name. 
Individuals often consider moral acts to be wrong because they believe 
that they intrinsically (by their very nature) harm another person or 
are unfair. For instance, hitting another person, by its very nature, 
causes harm, and taking others' possessions against their will or with-
out their knowledge is intrinsically unfair to them. On the other hand, 
conventional acts are not seen to be wrong because they cause harm or 
are unfair. Most people, when discussing the wrongness of conventions, 
merely mention that a rule has been broken, an authority has been diso-
beyed, or simply that they disapprove. For instance, children respond 
to boys kissing boys simply with loud laughter, signalling their disap-
proval. None of the common responses to conventional acts seems to 
depend on a characteristic of the acts themselves. That is, noone men-
tions why a convention breaks a rule, why the authority made the rule, 
or why he or she disapproves of the act. Emotional statements such as 
"I disapprove of it because it's disgusting" are sometimes heard, but 
few people can explain why they are disgusted by this act as opposed to 
5 
some other act. Therefore their disgust may not stem from intrinsic fea-
tures of the act. 
The studies listed below have shown that children's and adults' 
responses to events considered morally wrong do indeed focus on features 
intrinsic to the acts, primarily the criteria of harm and unfairness 
mentioned earlier, while responses to events considered conventionally 
wrong focus on aspects of the social order such as the rules involved 
and the disgust incurred in onlookers, not on features intrinsic to the 
acts. 
That the intrinsicality criterion is used could be said to follow 
logically from the fact that children do experience direct and unplea-
sant consequences as a result of many moral transgressions. For 
instance, they hurt when they are hit by others. But they seldom expe-
rience unpleasant consequences directly from conventional transgres-
sions; they do not hurt when they or others violate the school uniform 
code, for ex amp 1 e. Therefore it is quite plausible that even young 
children might infer from their own unpleasant experiences with hitting 
(intrinsic features of hitting) that hitting is wrong, and have to be 
told by others (an extrinsic feature) that not wearing the school uni-
form is wrong. 
A series of studies has been conducted to determine, by observing 
children's responses to transgressions, whether the above hypothesis is 
true, that is, whether children's responses to moral breaches have an 
intrinsic focus while their responses to conventional transgressions 
have an extrinsic focus. Nucci and Turiel (1978) seated themselves in 
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the rear of classrooms and unobtrusively tallied the responses of 
preschool children to moral and to conventional (applicable to that 
school or classroom only) rule-violations. Generally, the children did 
not respond at all to breaches of school rules, although the teachers 
usually did. But they usually responded to actions that hurt them, that 
is actions hypothesized to violate moral rules. Their responses to 
these moral transgressions did, indeed, focus on their intrinsic fea-
tures. They would hit the hitter back, or point out the intrinsic con-
sequences of the act, either by expressing their negative emotions or by 
stating that their friend had been hurt. 
Much and Shweder (1978) also recorded the reactions of preschool-
ers to rule-breaches. These children did occasionally respond to social 
transgressions, such as the presence of boys in a room where girls were 
undressing. But they merely pointed out the transgressions and the 
rules prohibiting them. When they responded to moral transgressions 
they pointed out the breaches and their intrinsic consequences, ignor-
ing the authority's possible censure. 
Turiel and Nucci (1982a) observed children on an unsupervised 
playground. Whenever the possibility arose that some kind of rule had 
been broken, they would call one of the children who had been involved 
in the event over to talk with him or her alone. They first asked if 
anyone had done anything wrong. If the child said " " yes , they then 
asked for a description of the wrong act. Then they asked why the act 
had been wrong. Again, the children responded to the intrinsic features 
of the moral breaches. They usually mentioned the unfairness of the 
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moral breaches or the fact that someone was hurt. Often they mentioned 
that someone other than themselves had been hurt or was the object of an 
unfair act; they were not simply thinking of their own well-being. But 
they responded to the conventional breaches only by mentioning the rules 
against them, or by saying that they did not know why they were wrong. 
Nucci, Turiel and Gawrich (1981), using the same methods as in the 
above study, found that elementary school children also tended to judge 
moral acts using intrinsic criteria (justice, harm, etc.) and to judge 
social acts according to the rules that governed them. In fact, some 
children responded to moral transgressions by requesting that the trans-
gressor consider how it would feel to be the victim of the transgres-
sion. 
A study was performed by Nucci (1984) where he asked Amish adoles-
cents why they considered various acts to be wrong. He tape-recorded 
the reasons they gave and later classified them according to whether or 
not they contained any mention of intrinsically negative consequences to 
others. He found that the moral breaches, again, received justific-
ations mentioning intrinsically negative consequences to others, while 
the nonmoral transgressions were given justifications mentioning extrin-
sic factors such as disapproval by authorities who had created the rule. 
In summary, acts which intrinsically harm or cause injustice have 
been hypothesized to belong in the moral domain because children and 
adolescents respond to these acts by mentioning features involving 
intrinsic harm or injustice. Also, acts which only violate rules set by 
parental or school authorities are said to belong in the conventional 
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domain because children, if they respond to these acts at all, respond 
only by pointing out extrinsic consequences such as their own or the 
authority's disapproval. Therefore intrinsicality of an act is consid-
ered by Turiel and other researchers to be a criterion for determining 
whether it is moral or conventional. However, this conclusion requires 
inferring that because children or adolescents mention intrinsic conse-
quences when saying why moral breaches are wrong they believe that the 
intrinsic consequences are what makes the breaches wrong. Perhaps there 
is some other common factor besides intrinsicality that joins the moral 
justifications and the nonmoral justifications together, for instance, 
that the moral justifications were the ones they heard from the relig-
ious leaders and the nonmoral justifications were the ones they heard 
from their parents or peers. One of the reasons for conducting the 
present study was to clarify this issue by specifically presenting pos-
sible justifications obtained from all three of these sources for the 
subjects to choose between, some of which stated intrinsic consequences 
and some of which did not. 
Unalterability 
Most people consider conventional standards to be alterable while 
moral prescriptions are viewed as unchangeable. Children have been 
observed in order to ascertain whether they consider moral or conven-
tiona! rules, or both, to be alterable. Davidson, Turiel and Black 
(1983) presented 6-, 8- and 10-year-olds with two stories hypothesized 
to depict transgressions which belong in the moral domain because they 
are intrinsically harmful or unfair, and two stories hypothesized to 
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depict conventional transgressions because they do not hurt others but 
are nevertheless prohibited by authorities. Children of all the ages 
studied judged changes in the rules prohibiting the conventional 
breaches to be permissible more often than they said that changes in the 
rules prohibiting the moral breaches were permissible. 
Several researchers have administered brief interviews to school 
children immediately after they witnessed various transgressions (Nucci 
& Turiel, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982). The children were asked whether 
the act just witnessed was wrong; almost invariably they responded that 
it was. They were then asked if it would still be wrong if there had 
not been a rule in their school forbidding the act, that is, if the rule 
forbidding the act was alterable. Over 80% of all the children said 
that the moral rules would still be wrong, but that the conventions 
would not be. That is, they considered the rules forbidding conven-
tional transgressions, such as making too much noise in the classroom, 
to be alterable and the rules against moral transgressions, such as hit-
ting classmates, to be unalterable. 
Weston and Turiel (1980) studied children's evaluations of school 
rules. Only 7.5% of the children believed it permissible for a school 
to allow children to hit other children, yet 67.5% said that it would be 
permissible for a school to permit children to remove their clothes on 
the playground. 
This evidence suggests that rule-alterability, like intrinsical-
ity, is very likely to be a criterion used by most children to place 
acts in the conventional domain. On the same token, rule-unalterability 
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is usually a criterion for placing acts in the moral domain. 
Unfortunately, most of the studies concerning this criterion have used 
only children as their subjects. At this time, there is only one study 
(Nucci & Junker, 1982) that shows that adults also use this criterion. 
This study will be described in the last section of this chapter. 
Universality 
Moral transgressions are seen as wrong regardless of the presence 
of governing rules while conventional acts are viewed as culturally rel-
ative, that is, wrong only if they violate rules of the member's relig-
ion or other culture. This is because moral rules are seen to apply to 
all human beings, whereas conventions are considered applicable only to 
the members of a specific religion or other culture, or to persons who 
work under the specific authority who made the convention. 
Weston and Turiel (1980) asked a second question of the children, 
after requesting evaluations of the alterability of school rules. They 
described an imaginary school where each of the wrong acts they had been 
discussing was not forbidden by the teachers and principal. They asked 
if a child in that school would be worthy of reprimand if he or she per-
formed each of the acts. That is, they tried to discern which rules the 
children considered to be universal, applicable in the absence of a pro-
hibition by the authorities, and which rules they considered to be rela-
tive, applicable only because of the authority's ruling. Only 45% 
stated that it would be permissible for a child in a school that did not 
forbid the act to hit another child. But 75% said it would be permissi-
ble for a child in the liberal school to disrobe on the playground. 
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Thus, Weston and Turiel's results demonstrate that even elementary 
school children distinguish between rules in the moral domain (covering 
intrinsically harmful or unfair acts) and rules in the conventional 
domain (covering arbitrarily wrong acts) by using the criterion of uni-
versality. If the rule is universally applicable their answers tend to 
place it in the moral domain; if it is not universally applicable their 
answers usually place it in the conventional domain. However, again, 
only one study has as yet been performed that tests the use of the Uni-
versality criterion by adults. This study will be described in the next 
section. 
Seriousness 
In general, moral transgressions are considered to be more serious 
than violations of convention. Smetana (1981) described several moral-
ly-wrong and conventionally-wrong acts to preschool-age children (ver-
bally and by the use of cartoon pictures). The children rated the mor-
ally wrong acts as significantly more serious than the nonmoral acts, 
and suggested more severe punishments for the moral acts as well. 
Nucci (1981) found similar results when he presented three types 
of acts to 7- and 20-year-old subjects: moral, conventional, and pruden-
tial. (Acts in the prudential domain are said by subjects to affect 
only the actor and to never be wrong at all. An example would be a cook 
forgetting to put yeast in the bread. It would be a mistake, but not a 
"wrong" act.) The subjects judged moral transgressions to be more seri-
ous rule-violations than either conventional or prudential transgres-
sions. 
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Davidson, Turie1, and Black (1983) asked the children they studied 
to prescribe punishments for the actors portrayed as having done some-
thing wrong. Children of all the ages studied prescribed significantly 
more severe punishments for the actors who broke moral rules than for 
the actors who broke conventional rules. 
Thus the seriousness of rule-violations has been shown to be used 
by children as a criterion to determine how they will react to rules. 
But, again, only the study to be described in the following section has 
as yet demonstrated the use of this criterion by adults. 
Therefore elementary school children have been shown to use all 
four of Turiel 1 s criteria for distinguishing between moral and conven-
tional breaches and adolescents have been shown to use the Intrinsical-
ity criterion. However, only one study has attempted to determine 
whether these criteria are used by adults; further, it measured only 
three of the criteria: seriousness, unalterability and universality. 
Piaget and Kohlberg: ~ Different View 
The findings of Turiel, Nucci, and their colleagues contradict one 
of the most important assumptions on which Kohl berg 1 s Moral Judgment 
Inventory (MJI) is based (Colby et al., 1979). Since the MJI has been 
the leading measure of moral development to date, it is necessary to 
briefly cover here Kohl berg 1 s opposing viewpoint. Piaget 1 s theory of 
moral development will be discussed first, since Kohlberg has based much 
of his theory on Piaget. 
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Implications for Piaget's Theory 
Piaget's theory, developed after watching boys playing games and 
debating about their rules, states that children originally believe that 
all rules decreed by authorities (for them, just about all rules) are 
unchangeable, that is fixed and absolute (Piaget, 1965). But they learn 
eventually that rules are determined by mutual consent and are therefore 
changeable. He called the first, undeveloped, level the heteronomous 
level since these children obeyed almost all rules, whatever their ori-
gin, and considered all rules to originate from authorities external to 
themselves. The second, developed, level, he called the autonomous 
level because these children had learned that they could set their own 
rules. Thus, these rules had an internal origin. He called the process 
of learning this distinction differentiation. 
But the evidence cited earlier indicates that even children as 
young as 3 years old can already distinguish between changeable and 
unchangeable rules, universal and culturally variable prohibitions. 
They do not always view obeying authority as the right thing to do 
(Weston & Turiel, 1980; Davidson, Turiel & Black, 1981). The evidence 
from the one study of adults (Nucci & Junker, 1982) also indicates that 
almost all adults continue to view some rules as unchangeable and uni-
versal while they continue to see other rules as arbitrary, perhaps as 
determined by mutual consent, as Piaget speculates, if not by authority. 
Turiel (1983) asserts that the source of Piaget's inaccuracy was 
that he observed only discussions about game rules, not discussions 
about moral rules. Violations of game rules, of course, do not have 
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intrinsically harmful or unjust consequences; if the conditions under 
which the game is played are changed the consequences of various rule-
violations are changed also. Violations of game rules are not consid-
ered to be as serious as moral rules either; they simply are not in the 
moral domain. Game rules are changeable and relative to the group 
playing the game, that is, made by mutual consent. Therefore, by the 
criteria of the individuals studied by Turiel and his fellow research-
ers, Piaget was studying only conventional development, not moral devel-
opment. 
Piaget held that he only needed to study game rules to learn 
children's attitudes toward all rules, moral and nonmoral, because chil-
dren cannot differentiate between different types of rules. However, 
Piaget presented no evidence that children cannot distinguish moral from 
conventional rules. Now Turiel and his cohorts have demonstrated that 
Piaget's moral development research was based on a false assumption. 
Young children do see rules "as external entities in the sense 
that they are put into effect and enforced by persons in authority" 
(Turiel, 1983, p. 148). But they also see that some rules can be 
changed by those authorities and are not binding unless they are 
enforced by authorities, while other rules are unchangeable and univer-
sal. Therefore Piaget was incorrect in assuming that because young 
children connect rules strongly to authority they consider all rules to 
be fixed and universal. Only the rules involving intrinsic harm or 
injustice are considered to be fixed and universal by children, and this 
opinion is also shared by most adults. 
15 
Implications for Kohlberg 1 s Theory 
Kohlberg's theory, although based on Piaget 1 s theory, is not iden-
tical with Piaget 1 s. Kohlberg has subscribed to Piaget 1 s assumption 
that children originally do not distinguish between universal and cul-
turally specific rules (Kohlberg, 1983), or between the moral and the 
nonmoral, and that they learn to distinguish these domains in time. But 
he does not hold to Piaget 1 s dichotomy between heteronomy and autonomy. 
He sees this development as more of a continuum than did Piaget. Chil-
dren between approximately 1 and 10 years of age (Colby et al., 1979) 
have a "morality of restraint" which Kohlberg views not only as hetero-
nomous but as external; Level 1 children view morality as restraint or 
coercion originating from adults. People between 10 and 20 or 25 (a 
very rough approximation since the rate of moral development varies so 
much) are at the "conventional" level, Level 2. They are said to have a 
"morality of obedience"; they obey moral rules and societal laws out of 
respect for the authorities and society from which they originated. 
This is not the heteronomy that Piaget saw, since morality and conven-
tion are still not clearly differentiated, but it is not autonomy 
either. Finally, some late adolescents and adults have a "principled 
morality" (Level 3); they view morality as mutually constructed and 
agreed upon by themselves and others, and are therefore considered to be 
autonomous. Only this group clearly differentiates between morality and 
convention. 
As seen above, Turiel objects to Kohlberg 1 s assertion, based on 
Piaget 1 s theory, that Level 1 children have an undifferentiated view of 
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right and wrong, that is, cannot distinguish morality from convention at 
all. And Turiel believes that adolescence (Kohlberg' s conventional 
level) does bring with it a concern for obeying conventional rules, but 
that this phenomenon is unrelated to the development of adolescents' 
moral reasoning. Since, from their earliest, external level, children 
distinguish between morality and convention, their later reasoning about 
convention must be evidence of development in an entirely different 
domain, the domain that deals with societal coordination and efficiency. 
Summary 
Kohlberg (1969) believes that all matters of moral right and wrong 
are intrinsic, unalterable and universal issues. And he believes that 
there are some nonmoral issues of right and wrong which are alterable 
and culturally relative, such as sexual matters. However, he does not 
refer to these alterable nonmoral issues as matters of convention; 
rather, he states that many of the issues Turiel would call conven-
tional, such as law and property, are universal issues of morality. Yet 
he defines the development of moral reasoning as, partly, a process of 
learning to distinguish between morality and convention. Hence there 
may be some confusion when his measure, the Moral Judgement Inventory 
(MJI) is used to determine subjects' moral reasoning levels. 
The studies cited above show that both children and university 
students, most of whom have not reached the principled level of morality 
and many of whom never will reach it, do distinguish morality from con-
vent ion. They demonstrate that Kohlberg does, indeed, need to revise 
the assumptions on which he has based the MJI. However, as will be seen 
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in the next section, the one study that has dealt with adults to date 
(Nucci & Junker, 1982) did not come to a definite conclusion as to 
whether sexual issues are moral or conventional. Do adults consider all 
sexual matters to be conventional issues, or are different sexual rules 
placed in either the moral, prudential (nonwrong), or conventional 
domains? It is important to answer this question because, if there are 
issues that cannot be experimentally placed in either the moral or the 
conventional domain, Turiel's argument that everyone intuitively knows 
what issues belong in each domain is weakened. 
Kohlberg has maintained that only persons who have reached the 
principled level of moral judgment, a small minority of individuals, can 
clearly distinguish between morality and convention. The studies of 
Turiel and others give evidence to refute this assumption. Turiel has 
stated an opposing viewpoint also: some issues are moral ones, some are 
not, and knowledge of the difference is not a developmental issue. How-
ever, in the area of sexual rules, he has not determined which issues, 
if any, are moral and which, if any, are nonmoral. This study attempted 
to delineate the sexual area in this way, as well as to add to the pre-
vious evidence that the moral and the conventional domains are distinct. 
It was hoped that Turiel's argument would be bolstered by these results. 
The Most Relevant Study 
The study most relevant to this research is one that was conducted 
by Nucci and Junker (1982). Fifty high school sophomores who were Cath-
olics were administered a questionnaire in a supervised group setting. 
Also, 50 Catholic undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Chi-
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cago were given the same questionnaire in a supervised group setting. 
The university subjects were obtained by asking each student who left 
the Universit;y of Illinois student union if he or she was a Catholic. 
Students who said "yes 11 to such a question in a public place were 
assumed to be good enough Catholics for this study, and were asked to 
attend the experimental session. They were paid one dollar if they did 
attend the session. 
The questionnaire administered to these one hundred Catholics 
briefly described 24 acts, 12 of which were hypothesized to be morally 
wrong using the criteria described above and twelve of which were 
defined as only wrong within the Catholic Church, that is, convention-
ally wrong. The subjects first rated the seriousness (Criterion #4) of 
each transgression using a scale that ranged from 1 (very seriously 
wrong) to 4(not wrong at all). All the acts are considered to be seri-
ous sins by the Catholic Church, and the first page of the questionnaire 
confirmed that the subjects were aware of this fact. On subsequent 
pages, a significant number of subjects rated the issues predicted to be 
moral ones, such as murder, as more serious than the breaches specific 
to Catholics, such as missing Mass on Sunday. 
The questionnaire then tested Criterion #2 (Unalterability) by 
asking if each act would be "still wrong'' or "alright" if the pope and 
cardinals were to drop the rule or law forbidding it. It should be 
pointed out that Catholic dogma holds that the pope has the ultimate 
authority to determine at least some matters of right and wrong for 
Catholics. The overwhelming majority of the subjects indicated that it 
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would be wrong for Church authorities to remove the rules governing the 
issues in the moral domain. But less than half the subjects believed 
that it was wrong to remove the Church laws regarding the conventional 
actions. Nucci and Junker (1982) concluded from these results that 
"subjects generate notions of the prescriptivity of moral actions inde-
pendent of the dictates of religious authorities" (p. 13). In other 
words, Catholics decide for themselves which actions are morally wrong 
and which are matters of arbitrary Church law, although they accept the 
Church's designation of which actions are wrong in one way or another. 
The final segment of the questionnaire tested for Criterion #3 
(Universality) by asking if each act was "still wrong" or "alright" for 
non-Catholics. Almost all the subjects universalized the moral trans-
gressions. They viewed moral breaches, such as stealing and killing, as 
wrong for non-Catholics as well as for Catholics. But less than half 
the students saw the conventional transgressions as wrong for non-Catho-
lics, who, unlike Catholics, are not subject to rules governing the 
acts. 
From this study one can conclude that the areas of morality and of 
religious convention are indeed seen as two separate domains even by 
members of a religion with a very strong set of conventions. However, 
Nucci and Junker found one rule, the prohibition of homosexual behavior, 
which was placed on the borderline between unalterability and alterabil-
ity (Criterion #2 above), universality and cultural relativity (Cri-
terion #3 above). That is, the prohibition against homosexual acts 
between consenting adult men was rated unalterable and universal by 
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fewer people than was stealing but by more people than was premarital 
intercourse. The question arises as to whether the subjects who consid-
ered homosexual behavior to be unalterably and universally wrong did so 
because they considered it to be a moral issue or because they consid-
ered it to be a convention the violation of which was extremely abhor-
rent, possibly because it was a sexual issue. In other words, have these 
Catholics stated that homosexuality is morally wrong because they have 
rationally inferred that it has intrinsically harmful consequences or do 
they simply see it as breaking conventional rules which they cannot 
explain rationally? 
To help answer this question, let us consider how Nucci and Junk-
er's subjects responded to the other sexual questions. "A man and woman 
who love each other have sex before they are married" was rated as seri-
ously wrong, unalterable and universal by many fewer subjects than was 
the homosexuality question. Obviously premarital sex was not considerred 
to be abhorrent, so if homosexuality was considered abhorrent it was not 
because it is a sexual issue. 
It is apparent that it cannot be determined from this study 
whether homosexuality is a moral or a conventional, a rational or an 
emotional, issue for Catholics. Although Nucci and Junker hypothesized 
that it was a conventional one, the possibility remains that this act 
was considered to be a morally wrong one by some subjects because of the 
perception of intrinsically harmful consequences to others, whether to 
the partner or to human life in general. Nucci and Junker also did not 
look at the sex differences in their subjects' answers. It is possible 
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that men reacted differently to this question than did women. Perhaps 
if the subjects' sex were ascertained, and if a question about female 
homosexuality were added, Catholics' attitudes to homosexuality would be 
clarified. 
In fact, it is not clear whether or not the premarital sex i tern 
was rated as alterable and culturally relative by so many subjects 
because it was considerea to be a conventional issue or for some other 
reason. It could have been rated as it was simply because its wording 
suggested that the man and woman were engaged to be married. Also, as 
with the homosexuality question, sex differences may have shown up in 
the responses. Sex of subjects needs to be ascertained, and a II • nonmar1-
tal II sex item, which specifies that the couple does not intend to marry, 
needs to be added to the questionnaire. 
It is possible that there is one other sexual rule that may be 
placed in the moral domain by a majority of Catholic subjects because it 
pertains to acts that are seen to have intrinsically harmful conse-
quences to others' welfare. In Nucci and Junker's study, the act "A man 
and his wife with each other's knowledge and permission each occasion-
ally have sex with some one else", like homosexuality, was rated as 
unalterable and universal almost as often as most of the more obviously 
moral issues such as murder. But, once again, were "open marriages" 
rated this way because of intrinsically harmful consequences (a moral 
criterion) or because the subjects considered having an open marriage to 
be a particularly disgusting violation of Catholic convention? And were 
there sex differences in the answers? 
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In summary, Catholics often rated certain acts as very wrong, but 
it is not known whether or not this result was a factor of the subjects' 
sex. It is also not known whether the acts, especially the sexual ones, 
were rated wrong for moral (rational) reasons or for conventional (often 
emotional) reasons. 
The purpose of the present study was to attempt to discern into 
which of these two categories Catholic men and women's justifications 
for sexual and nonsexual wrongness fall by asking the subjects to choose 
from several moral and conventional reasons in order to indicate why 
they rated each act as wrong. In other words, an effort was made to 
determine whether adults use the Intrinsicality criterion in distin-
guishing between seriously-wrong and fairly-wrong acts; the moral just-
ifications mentioned intrinsically-harmful or unjust consequences of an 
act, while the nonmoral reasons did not. This was an attempt to find 
out whether or not nonsexual acts are more often considered to be wrong 
for moral reasons, or not to be wrong at all, and sexual acts are more 
often considered to be wrong for conventional reasons. Also, it was an 
attempt to determine whether or not some sexual acts would fall, as in 
Nucci and Junker 1 s study, in a "grey" area between the nonsexual moral 
acts and the nonsexual nonmoral acts. 
CHAPTER II 
PURPOSES AND METHODS 
Purposes of the Study 
The first purpose of the present study was to replicate Nucci and 
Junker's study by showing once again that certain acts that are wrong 
for nonsexual reasons (murder, stealing, breaking a very serious prom-
ise, and rape) are seen as seriously wrong (Criterion #4) by a majority 
of Catholic university students, and that four nonsexual acts, (missing 
Mass and Communion on Sunday, missing }1ass on Christmas or Easter, and 
divorce) are seen as fairly wrong or not wrong at all by most of these 
subjects. The hypothesis was added that the seriousness ratings of eight 
sexual acts would fall between these two extremes, and that the sexual 
acts would fall into not one but two groups with respect to their seri-
ousness ratings, because in Nucci and Junker's study many of the sexual 
acts fell into a "grey" area between the moral and the nonmoral acts. 
That is, it was predicted that male and female homosexuality, open mar-
riage and nonmarital intercourse would be considered to be seriously 
wrong, though not as seriously wrong as murder, etc., and that kissing, 
masturbation, birth control and premarital intercourse would be consid-
ered to be more·seriously wrong than missing Mass, etc., though not as 
seriously wrong as homosexuality, etc., Appendix A reveals the actual 
seriousness ratings given each group of acts. (See Table 1) 
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TABLE 1 
List of Behaviors As Presented to the Subjects 
1. A healthy person does not attend Mass on Sunday. 
2. A man and woman who do not intend to marry kiss passion-
ately. 
3. A teenager engages in masturbation. 
4. A person goes an entire year without receiving Commun-
ion. 
5. A man rapes a woman. 
6. A married couple use artificial birth control methods 
(e.g. the pill, condom). 
7. A person, who is financially secure, steals money from 
another person. 
8. After promising to keep what he hears private, a man 
tells a woman's most personal secrets to a group of neigh-
bors. 
9. A man and woman who do not intend to marry have sexual 
intercourse. 
10. Two men, who love each other, engage in homosexual acts. 
11. A healthy person does not attend Mass on either Christ-
mas or Easter. 
12. A married couple get a divorce. 
13. A man and his wife with each other's knowledge and per-
mission each occasionally have sexual intercourse with 
someone else. 
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14. A man shoots and kills a stranger on a train platform. 
15. A man and woman who love each other have sexual inter-
course before they are married. 
16. Two women, who love each other, engage in homosexual 
acts. 
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The second purpose of the study was to answer four questions, two 
of which were posed in the previous chapter: 
Morality vs. Convention 
Are the behaviors considered by the subjects to be wrong seen as 
wrong because they are viewed as moral issues or as conventional issues? 
Thus, when Intrinsicality (Criterion #1) is tested, the eight acts 
hypothesized above to be rated as very seriously wrong (designated 
"wrong" acts) should be given a higher percentage of moral justific-
ations than the eight acts predicted not to be rated as very seriously 
wrong (designated "nonwrong" acts). That is, the "wrong" acts should be 
seen as moral breaches and the 11 11 nonwrong acts should be seen as either 
conventional breaches only or not wrong at all (prudential breaches). 
The two prudential justifications listed in the questionnaire indicated 
that the act harms only the actor. Subjects were not expected to use 
these, since an act's being only a mistake that harms the actor should 
not be enough for it to be cons ide red wrong, and acts not cons ide red 
wrong were, of course, not given reasons why they were wrong. 
To elaborate on the findings of Nucci and Junker, it was also pre-
dieted that the eight sexual acts, although in a "grey" area between the 
two groups of nonsexual acts, would fall into not one but two groups 
with respect to their seriousness ratings and the number of moral just-
ifications they received. That is, the four "wrong" acts that are sex-
ual were expected to be rated as more seriously wrong and to be given 
27 
more moral justifications (as opposed to nonmoral justifications) than 
were the four "nonwrong" sexual acts. This hypothesis originated from 
personal observation; many individuals appear to think in terms of two 
different groups of sexual acts, those that are wrong and moral issues, 
and those that are not wrong and are not moral issues. 
Thus, an interaction between sexual vs. nonsexual acts and "wrong" 
vs. "nonwrong" acts was expected, since the sexual acts were predicted 
to fall into two groups between the two groups of nonsexual acts. It 
was hypothesized that the highest seriousness ratings and the most moral 
justifications would be given for the nonsexual, seriously wrong acts; 
the next highest amount of seriousness ratings and percentage of moral 
justifications should be given for sexual seriously-wrong acts. Then 
sexual non-seriously-wrong acts should follow, and nonsexual, non-seri-
ously-wrong acts should receive the lowest seriousness ratings and num-
ber of moral justifications. Thus, the nonsexual "wrong" acts should be 
most likely to be considered to be moral issues according to both the 
Seriousness and Intrinsicality criteria, the sexual "wrong" acts should 
be the second most likely to be considered moral, and the sexual "non-
wrong" acts should be the third most likely to be considered moral. The 
nonsexual "nonwrong" acts should be the least likely to be considered to 
be moral issues. 
One of the 16 acts, rape, was quite difficult to place in a group. 
Rape is obviously a sexual act, but it is definitely a violent act also. 
Thus, there was a question as to whether it should be placed among the 
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violent acts (the nonsexual "wrong" acts) or the serious sexual acts. 
The decision was made to place it in the former group because it was 
predicted that university students would focus on the violent rather 
than on the sexual nature of rape when trying to decide how seriously 
wrong it is. That is, it was predicted that the same seriousness rat-
ings would be given to rape as to the nonsexual "wrong" acts, and lower 
seriousness ratings would be given to all the other sexual acts because 
none of the other sexual acts necessarily involves violence. 
Unalterability 
Are the acts considered by the subjects to be the most seriously 
wrong rated as alterable or unalterable (Criterion #2)? It was hypoth-
esized that the acts rated as the most seriously wrong would also be 
rated as unalterable and that the acts rated as the least seriously 
wrong or as not wrong would be rated as alterable. 
Univer_~a.lity 
Are the acts considered by the subjects to be the most seriously 
wrong rated as universally wrong or as culturally relative (Criterion 
#3)? It was hypothesized that the acts rated as the most seriously wrong 
would also be rated as universally wrong and that the acts rated as the 
least seriously wrong would be rated as culturally relative. 
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Sex Differences 
How do men and women differ in their ratings of seriousness, 
alterability and universality of each of the groups of acts? Are women 
more likely than men to see acts, especially sexual acts, as belonging 
in the moral domain? It was hypothesized that women would be more likely 
than men to rate sexual acts as serious, unalterable and universal, 
because women may have been socialized to view sexual issues more 
strictly. But, adding an interaction to the hypothesis, women were also 
predicted to be more likely to rate sexual acts as wrong for conven-
tional reasons, again because they were socialized more carefully than 
were men concerning sexual right and wrong. Theorists have tried to 
explain this predicted sex difference in socialization in many ways. 
Social learning theorists say that girls model their sexual behavior on 
that of their mothers, which is more strict than that of their fathers. 
Sociobiologists claim that, since women have babies and men do not, it 
is only to the women's advantage to restrict themselves to one sexual 
partner who can help protect the children. 
Specifically, then, it was predicted that women would give more 
"very seriously wrong", "seriously wrong", unalterable, and universal 
ratings to the sexual acts than would men, while there would be no sex 
difference here in the nonsexual acts. But women should give fewer 
moral justifications for the wrongness of the sexual acts than men, even 
though they should consider the sexual acts to be more seriously wrong 
than men. (For the nonsexual acts, both the men and the women were pre-
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dieted, as stated above, to give more moral justifications to the acts 
they considered to be more serious.) 
Methods 
Subjects and Materials 
One hundred two students consisting of 48 men, 50 women and four 
subjects who failed to write their sex volunteered to participate in the 
study. An attempt was made to enlist only students who considered them-
selves to be practicing Catholics. Most of the subjects were attending 
one of Loyola University's general psychology classes. 
A cover sheet adapted from that used by Nucci and Junker was used 
to ascertain whether all subjects could, indeed, be considered to be 
practicing Catholics. Fifty-six percent of the subjects stated that 
they attend Mass and receive Communion at least every Sunday. Seventy-
two percent have had at least a few years of education in a Catholic 
school as children. Eighty-eight percent of the subjects stated that 
they adhere to the basic Catholic belief, the virgin birth, while 98 
percent adhere to the belief in Christ's resurrection. However, only 41 
percent believe that the pope is infallible when he speaks officially on 
matters of faith and morals. 
The questionnaire was also similar to that used by Nucci and 
Junker, although it was considerably shorter because only eight of Nucci 
and Junker's many nonsexual acts were used. (See Appendix C.) In all, 
thirteen of the behaviors they listed were selected for use in this 
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study; an attempt was made to choose an equal number of sexual and 
nonsexual acts and an equal number of acts that would be considered to 
be seriously wrong and not wrong. Twelve of the 13 behaviors were cop-
ied word for word. One of the behaviors, "A man and woman have sex 
before they are married" was reworded to, "A man and woman have sexual 
intercourse before they are married" to prevent misunderstanding. Three 
more acts were added, bringing the total number of acts to 16. The non-
marital intercourse item needed to clarify the answers to the premarital 
intercourse question was one of the three acts. The female homosexual-
ity item mentioned in Chapter I was another. And an item describing 
"passionate kissing" was added so that the sexual "wrong" group of acts 
would contain four items as the other groups do. The section to deter-
mine whether subjects were aware that the Church forbids all the acts 
was deleted, and a list of justifications was added. The three added 
questions were checked with Catholic authorities to make sure that the 
Catholic Church considers them to be serious sins. (Added portions were 
written by the author.) 
On page 4 of the questionnaire a list of 13 justifications for why 
a given act could be wrong was included in order to test the Intrinsi-
cality criterion, as mentioned in Chapter I, Section B. Seven of the 
reasons were moral ones, that is, they mentioned the intrinsic conse-
quences (harm o·r injustice) of the act or the universality and unalter-
ability of its wrongness. Persons who gave these reasons could be said 
to be reasoning from the acts' intrinsic features to the fact that they 
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are wrong. 
Eight of the justifications were nonmoral; they did not involve 
intrinsic features of the acts. Of the nonmoral reasons, five were con-
ventional reasons, since they stated that the act violated Catholic 
rules or could cause the perpetrator to incur scorn or disgust. Two 
were prudential reasons, mentioning only possible harm to the perpetra-
tor. Persons who gave these reasons could not be said to be reasoning 
to the wrongness of acts; they would be showing concern that authority 
would be violated or others would disapprove or, in the case of the pru-
dential acts, that they themselves would suffer. 
There were two versions of the justification page, to find out 
whether the subjects' responses were affected by the order of the just-
ifications. The justifications were first listed in random order, and 
this format was designated 11A11 • Then the order of the justifications 
was reversed; this format was designated 11 B11 • 
Procedures 
Seriousness of act. The questionnaire was administered in many 
small supervised groups. The first variable, Seriousness, was measured 
on pages 2 and 3 of the questionnaire. (See Appendix C.) The subjects 
were asked to circle one of four numerals to describe each of the 16 
acts. The numeral 1 signified 11Very seriously wrong, 11 2 11seriously 
wrong, 11 3 11 fairly wrong, 11 and 4 11not wrong at all. 11 
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The data that resulted were tabulated in two different ways. For 
the purpose of performing the analysis relating seriousness to the per-
centage of moral justifications, the acts that were both rated as 1 
(very seriously wrong) and given moral justifications were first 
counted. Then all the acts rated as 1 were counted. Afterward, the 
number of 1 acts given moral justifications was divided by the total 
number of 1 acts, creating a percentage of very serious acts given moral 
justifications. The same process was used to create a percentage of 
moral justifications given to the 2 (seriously wrong) acts and to the 3 
(fairly wrong) acts. Data analysis compared these three percentages. 
For the purpose of comparing seriousness with nature (sexual vs. 
nonsexual) and hypothesized wrongness of acts, the numbers pertaining to 
the seriousness ratings circled by each subject for the II II wrong nons ex-
ual acts, "wrong" sexual acts, "nonwrong" sexual acts and "nonwrong" 
nonsexual acts were each totaled, producing four sums. Data analysis 
compared these sums. 
Moral vs. nonmoral justifications. The second variable, moral vs. 
nonmoral (conventional or prudential) justifications for the wrongness 
of acts, was measured by having the subjects read a list of possible 
justifications on page 4 of the questionnaire. Then they returned to 
pages 2 and 3 and wrote the letter corresponding the justification they 
considered most appropriate after each act they had rated as wrong. 
Acts not considered to be wrong were, of course, not to be given reasons 
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why they were wrong, so the subjects placed an X after each of these 
acts. 
For the purpose of relating the number of moral justifications 
given to the nature and wrongness of the acts, the number of moral just-
ifications given by each subject for why each group of acts (nonsexual 
"wrong," sexual "wrong," sexual "nonwrong" and nonsexual "nonwrong") was 
wrong was simply counted. Data analysis compared the four numbers. 
Unalterability. The third variable, unalterability, was measured 
on page 5, where the question was posed, "For each act, if the pope and 
cardinals agreed to drop the rule or law, would the act be still wrong 
or all right?" Blanks were arrayed in columns under the two phrases 
"still wrong" and "all right," and the subjects placed a check on the 
blank under the phrase that they believed applied to each act, providing 
a 2-point scale. 
The set of unalterability data was tabulated in much the same way 
that the first set of seriousness data was tabulated. The acts rated as 
unalterable ("still wrong" after being changed by the pope) were first 
counted. Then they were divided by the total number of acts which were 
both rated as unalterable and given one or another type of justific-
ation. (It will be remembered that acts rated as not wrong were not 
given justifications.) Next, the acts rated as alterable were counted 
and converted to a percentage by also being divided by the total number 
of acts given justifications. The analysis compared the percentage of 
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moral justifications given to acts rated as unalterable with the 
percentage of moral justifications given to acts rated as alterable. 
Universality. The fourth variable, universality, was measured on 
page 6, where the question was posed, "For each act indicate whether it 
would be wrong or all right for another religion to have no rule or law 
about the act." As for unalterability, blanks were arrayed in columns 
under the two phrases "still wrong" and "all right," and the subjects 
placed a check on the blank under the phrase that they believed applied 
to each act. 
Universality data were obtained in exactly the same way that the 
unalterability data were obtained. Then data analysis compared the per-
centage of moral justifications given to acts rated as universal with 
the percentage of moral justifications given to acts rated as culturally 
relative. 
In conclusion, the data obtained in this study were tabulated in 
such a way as to try to answer the question which arose from Nucci and 
Junker 1 s research as to which issues Catholics consider to be moral 
ones, and which they consider to be conventional and therefore applica-
ble only to Catholics. It was also hoped that the study would answer 
the question as to what the sex differences in university students 1 
views of the various acts are. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Morality vs. Convention 
Relation of Seriousness, Sex of Subject and Justifications 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (R-ANOVA) was performed, 
where the between-subject variable was sex of subject and the within-
subject variable was the seriousness rating given each act by each sub-
ject. The seriousness ratings were coded 1 (very seriously wrong), 2 
(seriously wrong) and 3 (fairly wrong). The dependent variable was the 
percentage of moral justifications given for each of these seriousness 
ratings. (The results are shown in Figure 1 and Table 2.) 
Moral vs. Nonmoral Acts. The data confirmed the hypothesis that a 
significantly higher percentage of moral justifications would be given 
for the acts that were rated as most seriously wrong (the "wrong" acts) 
than for the acts rated as least seriously wrong (the "nonwrong" acts), 
[.[(2,174)=33.96, £<.0001). Subsequent ~tests showed that the differ-
ences in percentage of moral justifications between the three serious-
ness ratings were all significant (all ES<. 001). These results show 
that the acts seen by the subjects to be the most seriously wrong were 
significantly more often seen as wrong for moral reasons than for nonmo-
ral reasons and that the acts seen to be the least seriously wrong were 
seen as wrong for nonmoral reasons significantly more often than for 
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Figure 1: Percent of Moral Justifications as a Function of Seriousness 
of Act 
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TABLE 2 
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Seriousness of Act and Sex 
Male Female Marginal 
1 Acts 74.2 78.9 76.7 
2 Acts 62.1 59.3 60.6 
3 Acts 46.0 33.4 39.5 
Marginal 60.8 57.2 58.9 
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moral reasons. That is, the behaviors viewed as most seriously wrong 
were considered to be moral issues and the acts viewed as least 
seriously wrong were considered to be conventional issues. Also, as 
expected, the prudential justifications were rarely used. 
Male vs. Female Subjects. The hypothesis that the percentage of 
moral justifications used by men and by women would differ was not sup-
ported by the data [I(1,87)=0.50, n.s.]. Thus, the men and the women 
used equal percentages of moral justifications; the women did not see 
wrong acts as wrong for emotional reasons any more often than did men. 
The expected sex by seriousness interaction was not obtained 
[I(1,174)=1.87, n.s.J. 
Relation of Nature, Wrongness, Sex of Subject and Seriousness 
A 2 (Nature of Act) X 2 (Wrongness of Act) X 2 (Sex) R-ANOVA was 
performed, in which wrongness was nested within nature and wrongness and 
nature were both nested within the sex variable. (See Figure 2 and 
Table 3) The nature of an act can be either sexual, such as premarital 
intercourse, or nonsexual, such as missing t-1ass on Sunday. The wrong-
ness variable also contained two levels; it was simply hypothesized that 
eight acts, designated "wrong," would be rated more seriously wrong than 
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Figure 2: Seriousness Ratings as a Function of Nature and Wrongness of 
Act 
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TABLE 3 
Mean Seriousness Ratings by Nature and Wrongness of Act and Sex 
Male Female Marginal 
Nonsexual Nonwrong 6.229 5.200 5.704 
Nonsexual Wrong 10.667 10.840 10.755 
Sexual Nonwrong 2.146 2.320 2.235 
Sexual Wrong 8.208 7.660 7.929 
Marginal 6.813 6.505 6.666 
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would the other eight acts, designated II II nonwrong. The dependent 
variable was the sum of the seriousness ratings given to each of the 
four groups of acts (formed by combining the two levels of nature with 
the two levels of wrongness). Thus the dependent variable contained 
four levels. In this analysis, all the seriousness ratings, from 1 (very 
serious) to 4 (not wrong at all) were used. The ratings were treated as 
continuous (although they were not necessarily treated as such by the 
subjects) for lack of a more reliable way to analyze the data so as to 
include the 4 (not wrong at all) ratings. (This violated the assumption 
that the dependent variable was a continuous rating.) 
"Wrong" vs. "nonwrong" acts. Supporting the prediction, the eight 
"wrong" acts received significantly higher total seriousness ratings 
than did the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong" [.£:(1,96)=910.79, 
E<.0001]. This demonstrates that the "wrong" acts are considered to be 
significantly more seriously wrong than are the "nonwrong" acts. This 
is evidence that the hypotheses were correct in their predictions of 
which acts would be seen as "wrong" and which acts would be seen as 
"nonwrong" by the subjects. (See Table 4) 
Sexual vs. nonsexual acts. Unexpectedly, the nonsexual acts 
received significantly higher seriousness ratings than did the sexual 
acts [£(1,96)=253.51, E<.0001]. Thus, in general, the sexual acts were 
viewed as significantly less serious by these subjects than were the 
nonsexual acts. (See Table 4) 
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TABLE 4 
Percentage of Responses Given Using Each Seriousness Rating 
Very Fairly Not 
Seriously Seriously Seriously Wrong 
Wrong (1) Wrong (2) Wrong (3) At All 
Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts 
5. Rape 97.1 2.0 0.0 1.0 
7. Stealing 67.6 29.4 2.9 0.0 
8. Br. Promise 52.0 35.3 11.8 1.0 
14. Murder 97.1 2.0 1.0 0.0 
Sexual "Wrong" Acts 
9. Nonmar. Int. 17.6 18.6 32.4 31.4 
10. Male Homo. 50.0 20.6 19.6 9.8 
13. Open Mar. 55.9 29.4 9.8 4.9 
16. Fern. Homo 50.0 20.6 19.6 9.8 
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TABLE 4 (cont.) 
Very Fairly Not 
Seriously Seriously Seriously Wrong 
Wrong (1) Wrong (2) Wrong (3) At All 
Nonsexual "Nonwrong" Acts 
1. Miss Mass 8.8 21.6 45.1 24.5 
4. Miss Comm. 17.6 28.4 33.3 20.6 
11. Xmas, Eas. 28.4 26.5 31.4 13.7 
12. Divorce 17.6 29.4 27.5 25.5 
Sexual "Nonwrong " Acts 
2. Kissing 0.0 2.9 10.8 86.3 
3. Mastur. 7.8 15.7 28.4 48.0 
6. Birth Cont. 3.9 6.9 22.5 66.7 
15. Prem. Int. 5.9 13.7 23.5 56.9 
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Mal~~~· female subjects. The hypothesized effect of sex of sub-
ject was not supported by the data [E(1,96)=0.60, n.s.], showing that 
men and women did not give significantly different seriousness ratings 
to the 16 acts. That is, the male subjects were not significantly more 
likely than were the female subjects to see the sexual acts as being 
more seriously wrong than the nonsexual acts. There was also no inter-
action between nature of act and sex of subject [E(1,96)=0.37, n.s.], 
and there was no interaction between wrongness and sex [E(1,96)=0.45, 
n.s.]. (See Appendix A.) 
Interaction between wrongness and nature of act. The interaction 
between wrongness and nature of act merely approached significance 
[E(1,96=2.90, £<.1]. Subsequent within-subject ttests revealed that the 
nonsexual "wrong" acts received significantly higher seriousness ratings 
than did the sexual "wrong" acts, which received significantly higher 
seriousness ratings than the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts. The sexual 
"nonwrong" acts received the lowest seriousness ratings of all. It will 
be remembered that an interaction had been predicted, such that the four 
groups would array themselves slightly differently: nonsexual II II wrong, 
sexual "wrong," sexual "nonwrong," then nonsexual "nonwrong." The 
results show, as expected, that the four sexual "wrong" acts such as 
homosexuality, are considered by university students to be significantly 
more seriously wrong than the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts such as divorce 
and missing Mass, as well as the sexual "nonwrong" acts such as murder 
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and stealing. That is, there are two distinct types of sexual acts, 
seriously-wrong ones and nonserious ly-wrong or nonwrong ones, in the 
eyes of university students, just as there are two distinct types of 
nonsexual acts. 
Overall interaction. For the dependent variable of seriousness, 
there was a significant interaction between nature of act, wrongness of 
act and sex of subject [£(1,96)=6.12, £<.05]. In order to discern how 
the nature-wrong interaction could have been only marginally significant 
while the 3-way interaction was significant, a simple effects analysis 
was performed which calculated separate CFC values for the nature-wrong-
ness interaction pertaining to the male subjects and to the female sub-
jects. It was found that, for the men, there was a significant nature-
wrongness interaction [£(1,96)=8.95, £<.05], but for the women there was 
no nature-wrongness interaction [£(1,96)<1.00, n.s.). 
Thus, the men's seriousness ratings did not increase from sexual 
to nonsexual "wrong" acts as much as the women's ratings increased, 
while the men's ratings increased much more than did the women's from 
sexual to nonsexual "nonwrong" acts. This means that the women saw 
approximately equal distinces between the four groups while the men saw 
the sexual "wrong," nonsexual "wrong" and nonsexual "nonwrong" acts as 
being somewhat closer in seriousness than did the women and the sexual 
"nonwrong" acts as being even further below the other acts in serious-
ness than did the women. 
47 
Continuing the simple effects analysis, the significance of the 
differences between the men and the women in each of the four nature-
wrongness groups was tested. 1 h 1 II II On y t e nonsexua nonwrong acts were 
seen significantly differently by the two sexes [!(1,384)=3.99, £<.05]. 
Thus, the men saw divorce and missing Mass and Communion as signifi-
cantly more seriously wrong than did the women. The other three 
nature-wrongness groups were given equivalent seriousness ratings by the 
men and by the women [all Es(1,384)<2.00, n.s.]. 
Relation of Nature, Wrongness, Sex and Justifications 
A 2 (Nature of Act) X 2 (Wrongness of Act) X 2 (Sex) R-ANOVA was 
performed, in which wrongness was again nested within nature and wrong-
ness and nature were both nested within the sex variable. But here the 
dependent variable was the sum of the moral justifications given for why 
the acts in each of the four groups were wrong. (Thus the dependent 
variable contained four levels. See Figure 3 and Table 5.) 
"Wrong" vs._"nonwrong" acts. Supporting the prediction, the eight 
"wrong" acts received significantly more moral justifications than did 
the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong" [!(1,88)=182.55, £<.0001]. 
This demonstrates that the eight "wrong" acts, besides being considered 
to be more seriously wrong by the subjects, were also considered signif-
icant ly more often to be moral issues than were the eight "nonwrong" 
acts. This is further evidence that acts seen as the most seriously 
% of Moral 
Justifications 
0.9 
0.6 
0.3 
0.0 
"Nonwrong" Acts 
Sexual 
Acts 
Nonsexual 
Acts 
Figure 3: Percent of Moral Justifications By Nature and Wrongness of 
Act 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Nature, Wrongness and Sex 
Nale Female Marginal 
Nonsexual Nonwrong 31.0 28.2 29.6 
Nonsexual Wrong 87.9 88.1 88.1 
Sexual Nonwrong 31.4 24.4 28.1 
Sexual Wrong 66.7 55.8 61.4 
Marginal 54.2 49.1 51.7 
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wrong were the same ones that were seen to be matters of morality, not 
of convention, as well as that the hypotheses correctly grouped each of 
the 16 acts as n u tt " wrong or nonwrong . 
Sexual vs. nonsexual acts. As in the previous analysis, an unex-
pected effect of nature of act was found. The nonsexual acts received 
significantly more moral justifications than did the sexual acts 
[£(1,88)=21.59, £<.0001]. Thus, in general, the sexual acts were viewed 
significantly less often by these subjects to be moral issues than were 
the nonsexual acts. However, four of the sexual acts were viewed sig-
nificantly more often than any of the "nonwrong" acts, including the 
sexual "nonwrong" acts, to be moral issues, as shown by the number of 
moral justifications they received. Thus, the interaction between 
wrongness and nature of act proved to be unexpectedly highly significant 
also [£(1,88)=18.77, £<.0001]. Subsequent !tests revealed that the per-. 
centages of moral justifications given were arrayed in much the same way 
that the seriousness ratings were arrayed. The nonsexual "wrong" acts 
received the highest percentage of moral justifications and the sexual 
"wrong" acts received the second highest percentage. However, the non-
sexual "nonwrong" and sexual "nonwrong" acts received the same percent-
age of moral justifications, significantly below the other two percent-
ages. Like the above results, these results clearly show that all 
sexual acts are not considered by university students to be nonmoral 
(conventional) issues, but that sexual acts, like nonsexual acts, fall 
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into two distinct groups, here a moral group and a nonmoral group. 
Nonwrong ratings were, of course, not included in this analysis, since 
acts rated 4 (not wrong at all) were not given justifications why they 
were wrong. 
Male vs. female subjects. Again the hypothesized effect of sex of 
subject was not supported by the data [EC1,88)=1.26, n.s.], showing that 
men and women did not give significantly different numbers of moral 
justifications. That is, the male subjects were not significantly more 
likely than the were the female subjects to see the sexual acts as being 
matters of morality. There was no interaction between wrongness and sex 
[EC1,88)<1.00, n.s.], although this interaction had been predicted. 
Interactions. Unexpectedly, there was no interaction between 
nature of act and sex of subject [E(l,88)=1.55, n.s.]. There was also 
no nature by wrongness by sex interaction [E(1,88)<1.00, n.s.]. 
Relation of Unalterability, Sex and Justifications 
A one-way R-ANOVA was done with sex of subject the between-subject 
variable and unalterable and alterable acts the two-level within-subject 
variable. The dependent variable was the percentage of moral justific-
ations for why the acts considered to be unalterable and the acts con-
sidered to be alterable were wrong. (See Table 6) 
Unalterable vs. alterable acts. Supporting the hypothesis, the 
data showed that the acts rated as unalterable received a significantly 
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TABLE 6 
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Unalterability and Sex 
Male Female Marginal 
Unalterable 67.0 66.7 66.9 
Alterable 43.1 26.1 34.4 
Marginal 55.1 46.4 50.7 
higher percentage of moral justifications than did the acts rated as 
alterable [£:(1,92)=51.62, £<.0001). This shows that the acts seen as 
unalterable are the same ones that are seen by these subjects to be mat-
ters of morality, not of convention. 
Male vs. female subjects. In this analysis only, there was a mar-
ginal effect of sex [£(1,92)=2.96, E<.l). However, here no difference 
between men and women had been expected! This demonstrates that there 
was a marginally-significant difference between the percentages of moral 
reasons given by men and by women. The data also showed a marginally 
significant interaction between sex of subject and unalterability 
[£:(1,92)=3.46, £<.1). 
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Relation of Universality, Sex, and Justifications 
A oneway R-ANOVA was performed using sex of subject as the 
between-subject variable and universality as the within-subject vari-
able. Again, the dependent variable was the percentage of moral justif-
ications given for each universality rating. (See Table 7) 
Universality vs. cultural relativity. As expected, the acts rated 
as universally wrong received a significantly higher percentage of moral 
justifications than did the acts not rated universally-wrong (cultural-
ly-relative acts) [I(1,92)=67.34, £<.0001]. 
TABLE 7 
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Universality and Sex 
Male Female Total 
Universal 69.1 69.2 69.1 
Relative 38.9 26.1 32.4 
Marginal 54.0 47.6 50.8 
Male vs. female subjects. There was no significant sex differ-
ence, as expect~d [IC1,92)=1.80, n.s.]. Men and women gave an equal per-
centage of moral justifications to the acts they considered to be uni-
versal and to the acts they considered to be culturally-relative. There 
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was no interaction between sex of subject and universality 
[E(1,92)=2.11, n.s.], also as expected. 
Miscellaneous Analyses 
An ANOVA was performed with Versions A and B of the justification 
page as the independent variable and the percent of moral justifications 
as the dependent variable. There was no effect of order of justific-
ations [E(1,93)<1.00, n.s.]. 
Also, a hand tally was made of the justifications for why some of 
the acts were considered to be wrong, specifically the controversial 
sexual "wrong" acts. Forty-seven of the 98 subjects said that "open 
marriage" is wrong because it "breaks a promise or vow"; the next most 
popular reason (also a moral one: that God's law for all human beings 
for all time would be broken) was chosen by only 16 subjects. 
three said that "open marriage" was "unfair". 
Only 
Twenty-eight students wrote that female homosexuality was wrong 
because "it violates the natural order, which requires preserving life"; 
this was likewise the reason chosen by 26 subjects for why male homosex-
uality was wrong. For both male and female homosexuality, this negative 
consequence to the preservation of life was the most common reason given 
for why the act was wrong. None of the students said that homnosexual-
ity was wrong because it was unfair. 
For the nonmarital intercourse question, three justifications vied 
for the most popular place. Twelve students said the act was wrong 
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because it violates God's universal law, a moral reason, but 13 students 
said it was wrong because it violates God's law for Catholics and thir-
teen because it violates Canon Law, which also pertains only to Catho-
lics. The latter two reasons are conventional ones; thus, the nonmari-
tal sex item was primarily responsible for the fact that this sexual 
"wrong" group was as far below the nonsexual "wrong" group in percentage 
of moral over nonmoral justifications as it was. Only one student said 
that nonmarital intercourse was "unfair". 
A hand tally was performed of the justifications assigned to the 
nonsexual "nonwrong" acts, in an attempt to clarify why these acts were 
considered to be more seriously wrong by the men than by the women. The 
vast majority of the subjects of both sexes considered missing Mass and 
Communion on both Sundays and holidays to be wrong because it violates 
either Canon Law or "God's law for Catholics"; a chi square analysis 
revealed that there was no significant different between the sexes here. 
There were quite a few sex differences in the reasons given for why 
divorce was considered to be wrong, an area where there was no clear 
favorite among the justifications. However, none of these differences 
was significant either. 
The men and the women gave the same number of moral and conven-
tional justifications for divorce, but three women and no men gave a 
prudential reason: "Anyone who did this would hurt him/herself psycho-
logically." Among the moral reasons, five men gave "is against the law 
laid down by God for all human beings for all time," while only one 
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woman gave this reason. This was by far the largest sex difference 
between the number of subjects who used any of the justifications. 
Although the predicted tendency for women to use conventional 
justifications more than men was not borne out by the data, a hand tally 
of use of the reason "The act is disgusting" for why acts were wrong was 
performed to see if women might nonetheless have been socialized to 
judge the morality of sexual acts more emotionally than were men. The 
"disgusting" justification was, indeed, used only pertaining to sexual 
acts. Forty women and 21 men used the justification; a chi square anal-
ysis revealed that the difference was significant [£<.001). 
Correlations 
This section will briefly review the results of the correlations 
performed on the data, one between the test of seriousness on pages 2 
and 3 and the test of unalterability on page 5, one between the test of 
seriousness and the test of universality (p. 6), and one between the 
unalterability and universality tests. 
Seriousness and Unalterability 
Spearman's rho was used to correlate the seriousness test with the 
alterability test, since neither of the tests contained interval data. 
It will be remembered that when seriousness was used as the dependent 
variable in an ANOVA it was treated as an interval variable for lack of 
a better way to perform the analysis. Actually, the scale was not an 
interval scale but an ordinal scale, since the distance between such 
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ranks as "seriously wrong" and "not wrong at all" cannot be quantified. 
Therefore Spearman's rho was thought to be the best measure to use to 
correlate seriousness with unalterability. (See Table 8) An attempt was 
made to ascertain whether, for these subjects, the two tests measured 
the same variable. For each subject, the seriousness rating given to 
Act 1 was correlated with the alterability rating given to Act 1, Act 
2's seriousness was correlated Act 2's alterability, and so on. Four-
teen of the 16 correlations ranged from 0.3 to 0.8; the overall correla-
tion was 0.49. Thus the two tests were moderately correlated. However, 
all the correlations (Table 8) except for the issues of rape (Act 5) and 
stealing (Act 7) were significant. 
Seriousness and Universality 
Spearman's rho was also used to correlate the ranked data of the 
seriousness test with the universality test responses. Again, the cor-
relations were done act by act. Thirteen of the 16 acts received corre-
lations ranging from 0.3 to 0.7; the overall correlation was 0.41. Thus 
these two tests were also correlated. All the correlations except those 
for stealing (Act 7) and murder (Act 14) were significant. (See Table 
9) 
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TABLE 8 
Correlations Between Seriousness and Unalterability 
Act Number Act Number 
1 0.57 "i':"i':-;"; 9 0.72 -;'~*"i': 
2 0.58 -;':;':;~ 10 0.59 ;':-;~;~ 
3 0. 77 ";':'i':-;': 11 0.48 -;':-;':;': 
4 0.42 ;~;':;': 12 0.70 ";':;':;': 
5 -0.02 13 0.33 ";':;':;': 
6 0.67 ;':t':;': 14 0.58 'i':··k-;': 
7 0.04 15 0.57 'i':;':;': 
8 0.26 ,,,..,,, 16 0.59 ";'(;~;': 
-k £<.05 "i':'i': £<.01 ·'i':'i':-;'\ £<.001 
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TABLE 9 
Correlations Between Seriousness and Universality 
Act Number Act Number 
1 0.33 ·k;';;.'~ 9 0.62 ··k-kt': 
2 0.53 ;':·#'\;': 10 0.56 ;':;':-;': 
3 0.64 ;':;';;': 11 0.30 -;';;': 
4 0.37 -;':t':;': 12 0.51 "t'r-;':i': 
5 0.19 ··k 13 0.27 ;':;': 
6 0.63 ;':··l:'i': 14 -0.04 
7 0.10 15 0.61 ;':;': .. k 
8 0.29 ;':;': 16 0.56 ;':;':;': 
.. k £<.05 ;':··;': £<.01 ;':-/:;': £<.001 
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Unalterability and Universality 
Last, Spearman's rho was used to correlate the unalterability test 
with the universality test, again, act by act. Thirteen of the 16 cor-
relations ranged from 0.3 to 0.8; the overall correlation was 0.49. 
This shows that these two tests were about as highly correlated as the 
seriousness and universality tests. Except for the correlations for 
rape (Act 5), male homosexuality (Act 10) and murder (Act 14), all the 
correlations were significant. (See Table 10) 
In conclusion, the results detailed showed that all the effects 
hypothesized were supported by the data except the sex difference. An 
unexpected effect of sexual vs. nonsexual nature of act was found, such 
that the sexual acts were significantly less likely to be rated as seri-
ously wrong or to be considered as moral issues than the nonsexual acts. 
And the seriousness, alterability and universality scales were signifi-
cantly correlated with each other. 
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TABLE 10 
Correlations Between Unalterability and Universality 
Act Number Act Number 
1 0.39 -;':~':~': 9 0.75 -;':-;~";': 
2 0.64 ;':";':"i': 10 0.14 
3 0.81 -;':"';':-;': 11 0.29 -;':";': 
4 0.34 ·k·k-;': 12 0.61 ··k-;':;': 
5 -0.02 13 0.62 ;':;':1': 
6 0.78 -;':-;':-;': 14 -0.02 
7 0.26 t':-;': 15 0.64 "';':;':;': 
8 0.42 -;':";':-;': 16 0.81 t':'i':;': 
* £<.05 
-;':-;': £<.01 "i':'i':-;': £<.001 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter will discuss the results detailed in Chapter III and 
their implications for the debate between Turiel and Kohlberg. 
further research in this field will be suggested. 
Differences Between Acts 
Last, 
The results of this study show support for the prediction that 
Catholic university students make a consistent set of distinctions 
between acts that are moral issues and acts that are not moral issues. 
Using Turiel's four criteria (cited in Chapter I) for determining what 
is moral and what is not moral, the subjects placed the eight acts pre-
dicted to be moral ("wrong" acts) in the moral domain and placed the 
eight acts hypothesized not to be moral issues ("nonwrong" acts) in the 
nonmoral area. The same eight acts predicted to be "wrong" were rated as 
universally applicable, and the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong" 
were seen as culturally relative (Criterion #3). The eight "wrong" acts 
were also rated as unalterable while the eight "nonwrong" acts were seen 
to be alterable (Criterion #2). Thus, Criteria #2 and #3 are used con-
sistently to distinguish what is moral from what is not moral. 
The students also used the Intrinsicality (#1) criterion; this was 
done when they chose justifications for why they considered the acts to 
be wrong. Use of this criterion placed the four nonsexual "wrong" acts 
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(murder, rape, stealing and breaking the promise) high in the moral 
domain and the four sexual "wrong" acts (nonmarital intercourse, male 
and female homosexuality and open marriages) lower in the moral domain. 
The analysis using seriousness ratings (Criterion #4) as the dependent 
variable instead of justifications showed the same hierarchy and the 
same amount of difference between the two groups of " " wrong acts. It 
may be concluded that, for these acts, Criteria #1 and #4 are used con-
sistently to distinguish the moral from the nonmoral, and that the acts 
are grouped the same as for the universality and unalterability cri-
teria. 
Use of the Intrinsicality criterion placed the four nonsexual 
"nonwrong" acts (birth control and missing Mass and Communion) and the 
four sexual "nonwrong" acts (kissing, masturbation, premarital inter-
course and divorce) at equal levels in the moral domain; that is, they 
received almost equal percentages of moral justifications (29% and 28% 
respectively). But use of the Seriousness criterion placed the two 
types of acts in two very distinct groups, since the mean seriousness 
rating for the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts was 5. 7 and the mean for the 
sexual "nonwrong" acts was 2.2. 
Does this mean that for the "nonwrong" acts Criteria #1 and #4 
were treated differently by the subjects? Examination of the data 
revealed that the answer to this question is no. The sexual "nonwrong" 
acts received far more 4 (not wrong at all) ratings than any of the 
other three groups. But the 4 ratings were not used at all in the analy-
sis where nature, wrongness and justifications were compared (the first 
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analysis mentioned above) so that there was little observed difference 
between the two groups of "nonwrong" acts. However, the analysis com-
paring nature, wrongness and seriousness did use the 4 ratings. Since 
so many of the 4s were sexual "nonwrong" acts, this caused the sexual 
and nonsexual "wrong" groups to become much more clearly separated from 
each other. 
The implications of these findings are, first, that, according to 
the first analysis, neither the sexual nor the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts 
were considered to be moral issues. Thus, for the "nonwrong" acts as 
well as the "wrong" acts, the Intrinsicality criterion distinguished 
between moral and nonmoral consistently with respect to the other cri-
teria. Second, the seriousness ratings showed that the nonsexual "non-
wrong" acts were considered to be matters of convention, not morality, 
since most subjects gave these acts "fairly wrong" ratings. The sexual 
"nonwrong" acts were seen as prudential matters rather than as moral 
matters, since they were usually rated as "not wrong at all." These 
results are not surprising because the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts are all 
covered by rules that are considered to be important for the stability 
of the Catholic Church. These rules may have been given considerably 
higher seriousness ratings than the sexual rules because Catholic adults 
understand their importance to the Catholic Church (their value as con-
ventions), while they do not conceive of the sexual rules as having any 
power to hold the Catholic Church together. That is, they see the sexual 
rules as only prudential issues; they are not seen as being wrong at all 
or, if wrong, wrong only because they are mistakes or matters of mis-
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judgment. Yet the nonsexual acts were given equal (but low) percentages 
of moral justifications as the sexual acts because it is understood that 
the acts are just as alterable as the sexual acts and are also applica-
ble only to Catholics. 
Therefore, it is clear that all the four criteria used by Turiel 
consistently allocate the eight "wrong" acts to the moral domain and the 
eight "nonwrong" acts to one or another of the two nonmoral domains. 
Also, while the II II nonwrong acts are all considered to be nonmoral 
issues, the sexual "nonwrong" acts are alone considered, for the most 
part, not to be wrong at all. The strong effect of sexual vs. nonsexual 
nature of the acts found by the data analysis is consistent with these 
results. The sexual "wrong" acts were rated as more seriously wrong 
than any of the "nonwrong" acts, but they were not rated as seriously 
wrong as the nonsexual "wrong" acts. Likewise, they were given moral 
justifications by more subjects than were the "nonwrong" acts, but by 
fewer subjects than were the nonsexual "wrong" acts. Thus, while the 
sexual acts fell into two distinct groups, one moral and one conven-
tional, they were nonetheless consistently ranked as less serious than 
the moral acts with the same wrongness rating. This interesting effect 
appears to result from university students' liberal attitudes toward 
sexual right and wrong. While the subjects were Catholics, their uni-
versity environment affected their sexual attitudes more than did the 
Catholic authorities. The rules specific to the Catholic Church, how-
ever, such as missing Mass, were probably not affected negatively by the 
university environment, and the rules forbidding such acts as murder and 
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rape may well have actually been strengthened by the environment. 
Hence, the nonsexual acts were considered to be much more serious 
issues, on the average, than the sexual acts. 
A few more remarks may be added to the discussion of the subjects' 
treatment of the "wrong" acts as opposed to the "nonwrong" acts. Exami-
nation of Table 3 reveals that the addition of the nonmarital inter-
course question did help to clarify students' sexual attitudes. Inter-
course without intention to marry was seen as far more seriously wrong 
than premarital intercourse, possibly because of the wording "before 
they are married," which makes it look as if the couple are planning 
marriage. Apparently university students take the marriage commitment 
very seriously; most of the students rated open marriages wrong also, 
giving the fact that it "breaks a promise or vow" as the reason. The 
students' assignments of justifications, therefore, clearly grouped the 
nonmarital intercourse, open marriage and homosexuality items in a seri-
ously morally wrong block and the kissing, premarital intercourse, mas-
turbation and birth control items in a not-wrong-at-all block, as can be 
seen by Figur~ 2. 
It will be remembered that the two issues of homosexuality and 
"open marriage" were answered in a confusing way by the subjects of 
Nucci and Junker (1982) and that this study included these items in an 
attempt to clarify them. This study also included a female homosexual-
ity item for comparison with Nucci's male homosexuality item. The sub-
jects, as expected, gave the male and female homosexuality items almost 
exactly the same seriousness rating, and they used exactly the same rea-
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sons for why the two items were wrong. Thus, for these students, 
homosexuality between males and between females is the same issue, mor-
ally. The nonmarital intercourse question that was added to the ques-
tionnaire completed the sexual "wrong" group. Almost as many subjects 
rated these four acts as universal and unalterable as rated the nonsex-
ual "wrong" acts as universal and unalterable. (See Tables 6 and 7) And 
the number of universal and unalterable ratings given the nonsexual 
"nonwrong" acts was not much smaller. 
But although observation of these unalterability and universality 
ratings alone would indicate that these four sexual acts are in a grey 
area between morality and convention, observations of the seriousness 
ratings (see Table 3) and the percentages of moral justifications (see 
Figure 3) clearly show that these acts are seen as distinctly more seri-
ous issues than are any " ,, non wrong acts, and are seen as moral issues 
also. 
Turiel used two criteria to determine whether or not acts are 
intrinsically wrong: the act could be unjust, or it could cause harm by 
its very nature. He did not predict that homosexuality and "open mar-
riage," or any sexual acts, would be moral issues because he saw no 
intrinsic injustice in sexual acts. Neither do most Catholic university 
students. However students do see certain sexual acts as intrinsically 
harmful. Most of the students believed that "open marriage" was wrong 
because it "breaks a promise or vow," a consequence that causes hurt to 
others. The most frequently used justification for why homosexuality 
was wrong was that it threatened the preservation of human life, also a 
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harmful consequence to others. These results do not leave too much room 
for doubt that there are at least three sexual behaviors that are seen 
as seriously wrong for moral reasons, even by sexually liberal univer-
sity students. 
Examination of Appendix A reveals that rape, as predicted, was 
grouped by the subjects among the nonsexual "wrong" acts rather than 
among the sexual "wrong" acts. The fact that it was considered to be as 
seriously wrong as the other violent acts shows that it was, indeed, 
considered by the students to be more a violent act than a sexual one. 
These results, as it had been hoped, further confirmed Turiel's 
theory that most individuals perceive clearly the distinction between 
morality and convention that he postulates exists for nonsexual issues. 
They also bolstered Turiel 's theory by showing that the eight sexual 
issues tested do not fall in a "grey" area between morality and conven-
tion but aline themselves clearly in one or the other domain, at least 
for Catholic university students. Thus, Kohlberg's theory that morality 
and convention are not clearly distinguished until and unless one 
reaches the principled level of moral development is further weakened. 
Differences Between Subjects 
There were no differences in how the men and the women rated all 
the sixteen acts as a group, but within one of the groups of acts an 
unexpected sex difference was found in the seriousness ratings. The men 
gave more serious ratings to the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts (divorce and 
missing Mass and Communion) than did the women. In light of the fact 
that fewer men than women are seen at Mass, this is a difficult result 
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to interpret. The conclusions of Gilligan (1982) and Haan (1975) that 
men are more apt than are women to reason hypothetically in moral situ-
ations may explain these results. Gilligan compared the responses of 
girls and of boys on Kohl berg's Moral Judgment Inventory. She found 
that the girls focused on relationship factors when solving moral dilem-
mas while boys focused, as Kohlberg expects, on logical deduction from 
hypothetical rights and duties. When presented with one of the dilemmas 
in the MJI, the "Heinz" dilemma, the boys usually said that Heinz has a 
moral duty to steal a drug needed to save his wife's life because the 
druggist refused to give him the drug and his wife has a right to life. 
However, many of the girls refused to see the issue as a logic problem 
for Heinz, as it was intended, and instead saw it as a communication 
problem between Heinz and the druggist. Thus, they suggested improving 
the communication between them, an interpersonal solution. The girls 
maintained that it was wrong for Heinz to steal the drug but that 
Heinz's wife could still be saved by other means. Gilligan writes that 
"Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and 
responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules 
ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their under-
standing of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of 
morality as justice [i.e., rights] ties [men's] development to the logic 
of equality and reciprocity" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73). 
Haan' s (1975) research on university students also shows a sex 
difference in moral reasoning. She maintains that adult women are more 
concerned with real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas, just as were 
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Gilligan's female subjects. To apply these ideas to the present study, 
Catholic men, while answering what they see as a a theoretical question, 
would say that the rule to attend Mass and Communion is a serious one, 
but while deciding whether or not to actually obey it would look for 
loopholes. On the other hand, Catholic women would consider the rule 
from a more practical, interpersonal viewpoint. It could well be that a 
healthy person would miss Mass and Communion because his or her child is 
ill, because a friend needs help, or for any number of relationship-cen-
tered reasons. And, as Gilligan states, love and interpersonal respon-
sibility are the major determinants of moral right and wrong for women. 
True, the questionnaire asked only for evaluation of the hypothetical 
rightness and wrongness of the acts, but the women may have nonetheless 
remembered real situations in their own past and therefore marked these 
rules as less seriously wrong than did men because of the extenuating 
interpersonal circumstances they remembered. The acts in the categories 
other than the nonsexual "wrong" group may not have been affected by the 
hypothetical/practical sex difference, since they already involve inter-
personal situations, as the Canon Laws do not. 
Divorce was also one of the acts marked less seriously wrong by 
the women than by the men. The noticeable, though insignificant, sex 
differences between the justifications given why divorce was wrong may 
explain this effect. Only women mentioned that by divorcing one might 
bring harm upon oneself, a very practical reason. Also, only one women 
gave "God's law" for all human beings as the justification for why 
divorce was wrong, while five men gave this very theoretical reason. 
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Thus the men may, again, have been thinking more hypothetically than 
were the women. 
Last, the fact that significantly more women than men used the 
justification "The act is disgusting" (only used for sexual acts) gives 
some support to the hypothesis that women may be socialized differently 
than are men concerning sexual morality. The prediction that women 
would see the sexual acts as more seriously wrong than would men because 
of differential socialization was not upheld, but these women do seem to 
view the morality of sexual acts from a more emotional viewpoint than do 
the men. This difference could, indeed have resulted from the predicted 
differential socialization concerning sexual issues. The women's 
socializers may have obtained a different result from the one they 
desired. Instead of instilling a strict, at least as compared to the 
men, attitude toward sexuality in the women, they may have merely 
instilled an attitude of disgust toward sexual matters. 
In conclusion, although the predicted sex differences were not 
upheld by the data, two unexpected sex differences were found. Catholic 
university men answer questions about the seriousness of specific Church 
laws more strictly than do Catholic women, perhaps because they think 
about this type of issue more hypothetically than do women. Also, the 
men in this study were less likely to state that the sexual acts were 
wrong because they were "disgusting" than were the women, possibly 
because of differential sexual socialization. 
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Correlations 
Spearman rank order correlations between the Seriousness, Unalter-
ability and Universality tests were performed in this study, as in the 
Nucci and Junker study. The three tests were found to be significantly 
related, but most of this study's correlations ranged from 0.3 to 0.8, 
while Nucci and Junker's correlations were all in the 0. 9 area. This 
difference probably resulted from one or both of two factors. This 
study's questionnaire was considerably shorter than that used by Nucci 
and Junker, who also stopped the subjects more often than did this 
researcher. Possibly their subjects became fatigued near the end of the 
study and took the easy way out by answering the last two tests, the 
unalterability and universality tests, in the same way. This study's 
subjects may have continued to make distinctions between the tests until 
the experiment ended, since it only lasted 20 minutes. 
Second, examination of Tables 8 to 10 will reveal that the nonsex-
ual "wrong" acts (Acts 5, 7, 8 and 14) showed the lowest and least sig-
nificant correlations. But the raw data reveals that, for these four 
acts, almost all the subjects marked 1 (very seriously wrong), 1 (unalt-
erable) and 1 (universal), while there was much more variance for the 
other 12 acts. Murder, rape, stealing and breaking the serious promise 
appear to show low correlations between the various scales only because 
the correlation statistic is based on variance, and, in this study, 
these four acts showed almost no variance. Thus, although the tests in 
this study were only moderately intercorrelated, there would nonetheless 
appear to be a great deal of overlap in what the tests measure. 
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In conclusion, as predicted, the behaviors considered by the stu-
dents tested by this research to be seriously wrong were seen as wrong 
because they were considered to be moral issues, not violations of con-
vention, even if the acts were sexual acts. Also, the acts considered 
to be fairly wrong or not wrong at all were seen as wrong either because 
they were considered to be conventional or prudential (not wrong at all) 
issues. 
Also as hypothesized, Catholic university students were found to 
group sexual acts considered to be seriously wrong by the Catholic 
Church in two distinct groups: acts that really are seriously morally 
wrong, such as homosexuality and "open marriage," and acts that are not 
wrong or only fairly wrong because they are violations of Catholic con-
vention only, such as kissing and premarital intercourse. 
The prediction that the same eight acts rated as most seriously 
wrong would also be the most often rated as unalterable and universal 
was also upheld by the data. Likewise, the eight acts rated as least 
seriously wrong were least often rated as unalterable and universal. 
Last, the hypothesis that men's and women's ratings of the sexual 
acts overall would differ was not supported by the data. However, the 
men did rate four of the nonsexual acts, the rules that are the most 
specific to the Catholic Church, as more seriously wrong than did the 
women. This was probably because women think of moral dilemmas in more 
practical terms than do men, and these dilemmas involved more leeway for 
hypothetical/practical differences than do the other issues. 
Thus, this study appears to have made a useful contribution to the 
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area of moral development by helping to answer the question as to which 
issues Catholic adults consider to be moral ones and which they consider 
to be conventional and therefore applicable only to Catholics, espe-
cially in the sexual area. 
Implications for Further Research 
The area of discrimination between morality and convention is a 
very small one at the present time, but only because it is so new. It 
is certainly a very important one and needs to be expanded. This study 
has shown once again that Catholic university students use moral 
(intrinsic) justifications for very seriously wrong acts and conven-
tional or prudential justifications for fairly seriously wrong acts. 
This contradicts Kohlberg's assumption that morality and convention are 
not clearly distinguished, if at all, until late adolescence or even 
young adulthood. Since this assumption is the basis of the MJI, and 
since the MJI is the major measure of moral development to date, a new 
test of moral development needs to be created that tests only the moral 
domain. Turiel's test could be used to measure development in the con-
ventional domain. 
Also, replicative studies need to be done to confirm the unex-
pected sex difference found by this study. If it is confirmed, the new 
test of moral development would have to take this difference into 
account in order to reduce the risk of sex bias. 
Once it has been established that morality and convention are 
indeed distinct areas, and tests of development in the two areas have 
been shown to be reliable and valid, it will be necessary to create val-
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ues education programs for the schools for each of the two areas. Val-
ues education programs can be found in the curricula of some schools 
already, but many of these programs are based on theories that confuse 
morality with convention (Durkheim, 1925/ 1961) and see all right and 
wrong as purely a matter of social consensus within particular cultures. 
That is, they do not see any rules as universally applicable or unalter-
able; they believe that all rules hold within certain societies only. 
This is because they do not see any act as wrong in itself, that is, 
intrinsically wrong. Morality, therefore, is the same as convention for 
them, and Turiel's four criteria are considered to be meaningless. 
But this and the many other studies cited in Chapter I have shown 
that children do see a difference between morality and convention and do 
use the Intrinsicality criterion to determine what the difference is. 
That is, many individuals see some acts as intrinsically wrong, and they 
also see these acts, for the most part, as the only morally wrong acts. 
Thus values education which does not acknowledge the existence of the 
two domains is doomed to failure. The young students, unable to inte-
grate what they are being "taught" in values education class with their 
intuitions about right and wrong, will not learn from such a class. 
For instance, whenever a child hits another child, the intrinsic 
harm and injustice needs to be pointed out; this response should not 
vary from child' to child and should not be subject to change. But when 
a child calls a teacher by her first name, no harm should be mentioned. 
Instead, the value of the convention of addressing teachers by their 
titles for the coherence of the school environment would be discussed. 
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Perhaps a vote might even be taken, allowing the students themselves to 
decide if this conventional rule should be changed or not. This 
acknowledgement of the distinctions between moral and conventional rules 
would certainly increase the students' respect for both the rules and 
the authorities, and might increase their obedience considerably also. 
Thus, this study has answered some questions but has also pre-
sented new questions. And it has given moral development researchers 
and educators more tasks that clearly need to be done. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
One of the most intriguing issues in the area of moral development 
has been the question of whether most adults see a distinction between 
the areas of morality and convention, that is, acts that are intrinsi-
cally wrong and acts that are wrong only because of societal rules 
against them. This study has shown that Catholic university students do 
see this distinction. In fact, most students are in agreement about 
what is and is not morally right and wrong. This finding is consistent 
with most of the research conducted by Turiel, Nucci and others, which 
has also demonstrated the existence of this perceived distinction. 
This study, like the previous studies, confirmed that Catholic 
adults use Turiel's criteria of seriousness, unalterability and univer-
sality to distinguish between moral and nonmoral issues. It also, for 
the first time, tested Turiel's intrinsicality criterion specifically by 
asking students to choose reasons why the acts seen as wrong were wrong. 
The Intrinsicality test showed results consistent with the results of 
the other three tests; Catholics do give moral justifications for very 
wrong acts and nonmoral justifications for acts are only fairly wrong. 
It was also shown here that, although Catholic university students 
see sexual issues in general as less seriously wrong than nonsexual 
issues, they do see some sexual issues as serious moral issues. That 
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is, they see some of the sexual acts that are forbidden by the Catholic 
Church as not wrong at all but some of the acts as seriously wrong 
because they harm other persons or the world in general. They view non-
sexual issues as belonging in two distinct groups also: acts seriously 
wrong because of intrinsic harm or injustice and acts fairly wrong only 
because they are covered by rules that are important to hold the Catho-
lic Church together. 
It was revealed that the Catholic university men saw breaking the 
rules specific to the Catholic Church, such as missing Mass on Sunday, 
as more seriously wrong than did the women. This sex difference, if 
replicated, should be taken into account by persons testing the moral 
development of Catholics both sexes. 
Last, the seriousness, unalterability and universality scales used 
here were sufficiently highly intercorrelated to show that these three 
criteria measure basically the same thing: whether acts are moral, con-
ventional or prudential (nonwrong) issues. 
These findings are not only important for psychologists seeking to 
understand moral reasoning processes. They are also important for edu-
cators, since value education can be improved greatly by basing both 
values testing and curricula on the greater knowledge of moral reasoning 
contributed by this research. 
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PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES GIVEN USING EACH SERIOUSNESS RATING 
Very Seriously Seriously Fairly Seriously Not Wrong 
Wrong (1) Wrong (2) Wrong (3) At All (4) 
~1 F M F M F M F 
Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts 
5. Rape 95.9 98.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Total 97.1 2.0 0.0 1.0 
7. Stealing 63.3 71.4 32.7 28.6 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 67.6 29.4 2.9 0.0 
8. Br. Promise 40.8 61.2 40.8 30.6 16.3 8.2 2.0 0.0 
Total 52.0 35.3 11.8 1.0 
14. Murder 98.0 95.9 2.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 97.1 2.0 1.0 0.0 
Sexual "Wrong" Acts 
9. Nonmar. Int. 14.3 22.4 18.4 16.3 32.7 34.7 34.7 26.5 
Total 17.6 18.6 32.4 31.4 
10. Male Homo. 67.3 34.7 16.3 26.5 10.2 26.5 6.1 12.2 
Total 50.0 20.6 19.6 9.8 
13. Open Mar. 40.8 71.4 40.8 18.4 12.2 6.1 6.1 4.1 
Total 55.9 29.4 9.8 4.9 
16. Fern. Homo. 61.2 40.8 20.4 22.4 12.2 24.5 6.1 12.2 
Total 50.0 20.6 19.6 9.8 
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Very Seriously Seriously Fairly Seriously Not Wrong 
Wrong (1) Wrong (2) Wrong (3) At All (4) 
M F M F M F M F 
Nonsexual "Nonwrong II Acts 
1. ~!iss Mass 10.2 8.2 28.6 12.2 38.8 55.1 22.4 24.5 
Total 8.8 21.6 45.1 24.5 
4. Miss Comm. 22.4 14.3 34.7 20.4 26.5 40.8 16.3 24.5 
Total 17.6 28.4 33.3 20.6 
11. Xmas, Eas. 28.6 28.6 30.6 20.4 30.6 34.7 10.2 16.3 
Total 28.4 26.5 31.4 13.7 
12. Divorce 22.4 14.3 34.7 22.4 18.4 36.7 24.5 26.5 
Total 17.6 29.4 27.5 25.5 
Sexual "Nonwrong" Acts 
2. Kissing 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.1 12.2 10.2 85.7 85.7 
Total 0.0 2.9 10.8 86.3 
3. Mastur. 6.1 10.2 18.4 14.3 30.6 22.4 44.9 53.1 
Total 7.8 15.7 28.4 48.0 
6. Birth Cont. 4.1 4.1 6.1 8.2 24.5 20.4 65.3 67.3 
Total 3.9 6.9 22.5 66.7 
15. Prem. Int. 4.1 8.2 10.2 18.4 26.5 18.4 59.2 55.1 
Total 5.9 13.7 23.5 56.9 
APPENDIX B 
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS SAYING THAT ACTS ARE UNALTERABLE, UNIVERSAL 
Act Rating 
5. Rape 
7. Stealing 
8. Breaking 
a Promise 
14. Murder 
9. Nonmarital 
Intercourse 
10. Male 
Homosexuality 
13. Open 
Marriages 
16. Female 
Homosexuality 
Unalterable Universal 
Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts 
99.0 95.1 
97.1 96.1 
96.1 89.2 
99.0 97.1 
Sexual "Wrong" Acts 
53.9 47.1 
79.4 73.5 
87.3 83.3 
79.4 74.5 
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Act Rating 
1. Missing 
Mass 
4. Missing 
Communion 
11. Missing 
Easter Duty 
12. Divorce 
2. Kissing 
3. Mastur-
bation 
6. Birth 
Control 
15. Premarital 
Intercourse 
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Unalterable Universal 
Nonsexual "Nonwrong" Acts 
58.8 46.1 
64.7 48.0 
70.6 55.9 
47.1 47.1 
Sexual "Nonwrong" Acts 
6.9 7.8 
38.2 37.3 
15.7 20.6 
18.6 25.5 
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89 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Your age: Your sex: M F 
Please give us some informatien regarding your Catholic back-
ground, Please answer each question by placing a checkmark in the 
space for the statement that most clearly r.escribes your experience. 
1. Did you attend a Catholic school while you were growing up? 
YES NO ------
If yes, what grades? 
K_ 1_' _ 2_ 3_ 4_ 5_ 6_ 7_._. 8_ 9_ 10_ 11_·12_ 
2. Did you attend Catechism class (rather than full-time Catholic 
school) while you were young? 
YES _____ _ NO ______ _ 
If yes, how many years did you attend? 
1 year __ 2 years __ 3 years __ 4 years __ 5 or more years __ 
3. About how often do you attend Mass? 
more than 
once a week 
once a 2-3 times 
week a month 
once a 
month 
4. About how often do you receive Communion? 
2-3 times 
a year 
once a almost 
year never 
more than once a 2-3 times once a 
month 
2-3 times once a almoxt 
once a week week a month a year year never 
5. IX> you believe that Hary, the mother of Jesus Christ, was a virgin 
at the time of Christ's birth? 
YES NO -------
6. IX> you believe that Christ rose from the dead after his crucifixion? 
YES NO -------
7. Do you believe that the Pope is infallible when he speaks and 
writes officially (e.g. in encyclicals) on matters of faith and 
morals? 
YES _____ _ NO ______ _ 
2 
For each of the following acts, please indicate whether you 
believe that the act is very seriously wrong, seriously wrong, fairly 
wrong, or not wrong 11t all. Circle ~ nUJ!Iber for each act. 
1. A healthy person does 
not attned Mass on 
Sunday. 
2. A man and woman who 
do not intend to marry 
kiss passionately • 
.3. A teenager eng11ges in 
masturbation. 
4. A person goes an entire 
year without receiving 
Communion. 
5. A man rapes a woman. 
Very Seriously 
wrong 
6. A married couple use 
artificial birth control 
methods (e.g. the pill, condom). 
?. A person, who is 
financially secure 
ste11ls .oney from 
another person. 
8. After promising to keep 
what he hears private, a man 
tells a woman's most personal 
secrets to a group of 
neighbors. 
9. A man and woman who 
do not intend to marry 
have sexual intercourse. 
10. Two men, who love each 
other, engage in homo-
sexual acts. 
Seriously 
wrong 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
.3 
.3 
.3 
.3 
3 
3 
.3 
3 
3 
Not Wronf' 
&.ill 
4_ 
4 
4_ 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Very Seriously 
1-lrong 
11. A healthy person does not 
attend Mass on either 
Christmas or Easter. 
12. A married couple get a 
divorce. 
1), A man and his wife with 
each other's knovrlodge and 
permission each occasionally 
have sexual intercourse 
with s~meone else. 
14. A man sho~ts and kills a 
stranger on a train 
platform. 
15. A man and woman who 
love each other have 
sexual intercourse 
before they are married. 
16. Two women,who love 
each other, engage in 
homosexual acts. 
Seriously 
l-lrong 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
STOP II JJO uor CONTINUE UNTIL TOLD TO 00 SO I 
Not tvrC~ng 
At All 
4---
4--
4--
4-
4--
4 
4 
Below is a chart of possible reasons why an act m:i:ght be wrong, 
Please return to the list on the previous two pages. For each act that 
you marked at all wrong, please roark on th3 line to the f~r right of it 
the letter that most closely corresponds to the most imp:rt~nt reason 
in the chart that the act is wrong. Use as many or as few of the 
reasons in the chart as you wish, but please do not mark more than 
one (1) letter for each act. If you did not consider an act to be 
wrong, please place an "X" on the line to the far right of it. 
Feel free to change any answers you wrote, and to pull the question-
naire apart to lay the pages out side qy side. 
A. To do/not do this would very likely hurt another person. 
B. It violates the natural order, which requires preserving life 
(including procreation), to de/not do this. 
C. If Catholics did/didn't do this, the Church would be in trouble. 
D. If everybody did/ didn 1 t do this, the whole world would be in trouble. 
E. It is disgusting to do/not do this. 
F. It is dishonest to do/not do this; either it breaks a prc·mise or 
vow or should be accompanied by a permanent co~~tment to the partner. 
G. Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself physically. 
H. Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself psychologically. 
I. It is unfair to do/not do this; it violates others' rights. 
J. Anyone who did/didn't do this would be scorned or laughed at. 
K. To do/not do this violates the laws laid down explicitly by the 
Catholic Church (Canon Law) for Catholics. 
L. Somebody told me so. 
M. To do/not do this is against the law laid down by God fer Catholics. 
N. To do/not do this is against the law laid down qy God fer all 
human beings for all time. 
0, In this situation, it is selfish to do/not do this. 
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In recent years the Pope and bishops have rethought Catholic values 
and decided that certain rules and laws of the Church should be changed. 
Below are listed several acts that are now against Church rules or laws. 
For each act, if the Pope and cardinals agreed to drop the rule or law, 
would the act be still wrong or all right? 
IF THERE IS NO LONGER A CHURCH RULE OR LAW 
ABOUT THE ACT BELOW, THE ACT IS ••• 
1. A healthy person does not attend Mass 
on Sunday, 
2. A man and woman who do not intend to 
marry kiss passionately. 
). A teenager engagQS in masturbation, 
4. A person goes an entire year without 
receiving Communion. 
5. A man rapes a woman. 
6. A married couple use artificial birth 
control methods (e.g. the pill, condom). 
7. A person, who is financially secure, 
steals money from another person. 
8. After promising to keep what he hears 
private, a man tells a woman's most person-
al secrets to a group of neighbors. 
9. A man and woman who do not intend to 
marry have sexual intercourse. 
10. Two men, who love each other, 
engage in homosexual ~ats. 
11. A healthy person does not attend 
Mass on either Christmas or Easter. 
12. A married couple get a divorce. 
1). A man and his •life with each other's 
knowledge and permission each occasionally 
have sexual intercourse with someone else. 
14. A man shoots and kills a stranger 
on a train platform, 
15. A man and woman who love each other 
have sexual intercourse before they are 
married. 
16. Two women, who love each other, 
engage in homosexual acts. 
STILL 
WRONG 
ALL 
RIGHT. 
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There are many religions besides Catholicism. Often these religions 
have rules and laws which are different from those of the Catholic religion. 
Below are li~ted several acts. For each act indicate whether it would be 
wrong or all right for another religion to have no rule or law about the act. 
IT WOULD BE FOR ANOTHER RELIGION 
TO HAVE NO RULE ABOUT THE ACT BELOW. 
1. A hoalthy person does not attend Mass 
on Sunday, 
2. A man and woman who do not intend to 
marry kiss passionately, 
). A teenager engages in masturbation. 
4. A person goes an entire year without 
receiving Comminion. 
5. A man rapes a woman. 
6. A married couple use artificial birth 
control methods (e.g. the pill, condom). 
7. A person, who is financially secure, 
steals money from another person. 
8. After promising to keep what he hears 
private, a man tells a woman's most person-
al secrets to a group of neighbors. 
9. A man and woman who do not intend to 
marry have sexual intercourse. 
10. Two men, who love each other, 
engage in homosexual acts. 
11. A healthy person does not attend Mass 
on either Christmas or Easter. 
12. A married couple get a divorce. 
1.3. A man and his wife with each other 1 s 
knowledge and permission each occasionally 
have sexual intercourse with someone else. 
14. A man shoots and kills a stranger 
on a train platform, 
15. A man and woman who love each other 
have sexual intercourse before they are 
married, 
16. Two women, who love each other, 
engage in homosexual acts. 
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